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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this paper is to shed additional light on the determinants of budget 
transparency in local governments. Our work is based on a Likert-type survey 
questionnaire specifically designed to measure budget transparency in small 
municipalities. The questionnaire is based on the IMF‘s revised Code of Good Practices 
on Fiscal Transparency (2007). Results from 33 Galician municipalities are used to 
assess its internal consistency and to test a battery of hypotheses on the determinants of 
budget transparency. While several previous findings of the literature are confirmed, 
some new results are also obtained.  
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1. Introduction 
Despite a recent upsurge in popularity, concerns regarding budget transparency 
have a long tradition. The establishment of representative democracies throughout the 
Western world brought with it a resistance to the secrecy that had previously been the 
norm in governmental accounting. At the time, budget transparency was closely linked 
to notions of executive accountability and principles of clarity in budgeting.  
However, in recent decades the term has been widely adopted by policy makers 
and popular media, and its meaning has evolved. Budget transparency is not just an 
element of governmental accountability to Parliament, but rather a tool for facilitating a 
relationship between public budgeting and market requirements, civil society demands 
and citizen participation. 
Budget transparency is particularly important in local government. Globalization 
has given rise to a greater recognition of the role of local government, demonstrated by 
a widespread resort to the subsidiary principle and a growing municipal participation in 
public policies. The strengthening of local governments along with substantial changes 
in the way those governments operate has kindled the interest of stakeholders in 
knowing what governments do, how and at what price. Fairly often, international 
organizations involved in promoting budget transparency consider local governments to 
be ideal for testing new systems or arrangements before they are implemented at higher 
levels. 
However, available empirical research on budget transparency tends to focus on 
national or regional governments. Moreover, studies generally rely on a few crude 
indicators or survey data from dichotomous-item questionnaires, often extracted from 
instruments designed for other purposes. Aimed at filling this gap, this paper presents a 
Likert-type survey questionnaire to measure budget transparency in municipalities. The 
use of a Likert scale
1
 promotes content validity
2
 and discreteness with a limited number 
of survey items. Rather than focusing on the existence of formal safeguards as evidence 
                                                 
1
 In this article, the word ―scale‖ usually refers to ―an instrument made up of multiple items that have 
a relationship to each other as well as to the concept of interest [budget transparency, in our case]‖ 
(Colton and Covert 2007: 249). A Likert scale is a scale composed of Likert-type items, as we explain in 
subsection 3.1. Although there are precedents for using Likert-type items in measuring budget 
transparency at the national level (Lavielle, Pérez and Hofbauer 2003; Pérez 2005), leading studies on 
determinants of budget transparency have tended to rely on the above-mentioned kinds of data. 
2
 According to Colton and Covert (2007: 68), content validity is the degree to which an instrument is 
representative of the topic and process being investigated. 
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of budget transparency, Likert scales make it possible to analyze the degree to which 
municipal practices and/or behaviors satisfy certain transparency-related criteria. Based 
on the answers to this survey by financial comptrollers from 33 Galician municipalities, 
we perform an empirical analysis on the determinants of transparency.  
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the definition, scope, and 
international standards for budget transparency. Relevant empirical studies on the 
determinants of budget transparency are also reviewed. Section 3 presents our survey 
and evaluates its consistency. Both the descriptive analysis and econometrics are 
contained in section three. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Approach to Budget Transparency: Definition, Scope, and Determinants. 
The notion of transparency is far from clear. According to Hood (2006: 3), ―like 
many other notions of a quasi-religious nature, transparency is more often preached than 
practised, more often invoked than defined, and indeed might ironically be said to be 
mystic in essence, at least to some extent‖. As a general governmental requirement, 
transparency goes beyond mere access to information, demanding that information 
prove understandable to external stakeholders. However, the editors‘ note of the OECD 
Best Practices for Budget Transparency does not state this requirement specifically 
when it defines transparency as ―openness about policy intentions, formulation and 
implementation‖, and budget transparency as ―the full disclosure of all relevant fiscal 
information in a timely and systematic manner‖ (OECD 2001: 7). The OECD requires 
preparation of budget reports, disclosure of specific data, and the establishment of 
procedures to ensure integrity (Table 1). 
Table 1: The ―three pillars‖ of the OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency 
Budget Reports Specific Disclosures Ensuring Integrity 
 The Budget 
 Pre-Budget Report 
 Monthly Report 
 Mid-Year Report 
 Year-End Report 
 Pre-Election Report 
 Long-Term Report 
 Economic Assumptions 
 Tax Expenditures 
 Financial Liabilities & Assets 
 Non-Financial Assets 
 Employee Pension Obligations 
 Contingent Liabilities 
 Accounting Policies 
 Systems and Responsibilities 
 Audit 
 Parliamentary and Public 
Scrutiny 
Source: Blöndal (2006: 4-7). 
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Although exposing the detailed development of the three pillars would be 
cumbersome, there are certain key elements which deserve to be highlighted. Regarding 
the budget reports, the OECD Best Practices outlines both minimum content and 
specific times when budget reports must be issued. Some prescriptions are based on 
classical principles such as universality or gross budgeting. Others, instead, are built 
upon more modern requirements that are still neglected in many countries, particularly 
in local governments
3
. A similar disparity is observed in the specific disclosures that 
form the second pillar and standard governmental practices. Few local governments in 
the world disclose the sensitivity analyses as required in standards 2.1 and 2.3 in fine, to 
show the effects of changes in macroeconomic variables like interest or exchange rates 
on budgeting. Concerning the integrity, control and accountability standards of the third 
pillar, a year-end report‘s audit by the Supreme Audit Institution is more common. 
Conversely, other arrangements like adjusting information on previous periods to 
provide temporal comparability, or making all reports available on line, seem to remain 
challenging for many local governments. 
Recently, revised versions of the Code and the Manual on fiscal transparency of 
the International Monetary Fund were issued (IMF 2007a, 2007b). Built upon Kopits 
and Craig‘s (1998) definition of fiscal transparency, the code sets standards relative to 
the openness to the public about the structure and functions of government, fiscal policy 
intentions, public sector accounts, and fiscal projections. The IMF Code is structured 
around four pillars:  (i) clarity of roles and responsibilities, (ii) open budget processes, 
(iii) public availability of information, and (iv) assurance of integrity. The first of these 
pillars can be considered beyond the scope of the OECD Best Practices, since that pillar 
focuses on the establishment of a clear distinction between public corporations, the 
private sector and the government. This is not the case with the last three pillars, which 
maintain multiple similarities with the OECD Best Practices, but go further in several 
respects
4
. We will thus limit the scope of budget transparency to the standards outlined 
                                                 
3
 For instance: i) inclusion of comparative and non-financial information, ii) explanation of deviations, 
iii) consistency in format between the budget and the final report, iv) issuing of monthly reports within 
four weeks, and v) audit and issuing of the year-end report within of six months. 
4
 The second pillar also requires ―clear mechanisms for the coordination and management of 
budgetary and extra-budgetary activities within the overall fiscal policy framework‖. The third and fourth 
pillars incorporate innovative provisions such as: 
i) publication of a periodic report on long-term public finances; 
ii) openness in purchase and sale of public assets; 
iii) mechanisms to monitor follow-up actions recommended by the national auditor; 
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in the last three pillars of the IMF Code, viewed as an updated and less detailed version 
of the OECD Best Practices. 
Transparency in public financial management is also receiving increased 
attention in public administration, political science and economics research. Empirical 
research focuses primarily on testing the benefits of fiscal transparency. This is the case 
of the work by Alt and Lassen (2006) focused on the effects of fiscal transparency on 
the accumulation of public debt in OECD countries. When dealing with endogeneity 
problems of transparency as regressor, they also find that measures of political 
competition, presidential system and common law variables do well in explaining 
variation in transparency, whereas debt level has no statistically significant effect
5
.  
A more direct analysis of transparency determinants is presented in Alt, Lassen 
and Rose (2006). Based on work by Hanssen (2004), the authors hypothesize that 
budgeting practices will be more transparent in systems marked by high political 
competition. In situations of high political turnover, incumbents will try to tie the hands 
of their potential successors (partisan adversaries) by reinforcing arrangements for 
transparency. In a similar vein, political polarization increases transparency; however, a 
more polarized polity could impede a cohesive reform policy and thus, become a 
hindrance to transparency. To these political but nonpartisan explanations, a partisan 
hypothesis is added that Democratic incumbents are more prone than Republicans to 
increase transparency, because of the greater transparency required for directing 
additional resources toward expand the public sector
6
. Along with political variables, 
the authors also note that financial outcomes may positively or negatively impact 
transparency. Incumbents may restrict access to information in order to avoid blame for 
poor fiscal performance, or facilitate information access to get credit for a favourable 
fiscal record. To test these theories, the authors construct an annual transparency score 
for the years between 1972-2002 using questionnaire data from budget officers in all 50 
U.S. states. The authors then construct the following equation for estimating fiscal 
transparency: 
                                                                                                                                               
iv) assessment of the fiscal forecasts, the macroeconomic forecasts, and their underlying 
assumptions by independent experts; and 
v) institutional independence of the national statistical body. 
5
 See also Jarmuzek (2006). Although he does not detail the effects of his instrumental variables on 
fiscal transparency, the variables used in the model include a political competition index (i.e. past 
turnover), the rule of law, and the media freedom index compiled by the Freedom House. 
6
 The authors base this hypothesis on model implications from Ferejohn‘s (1999). 
6                                                   International Studies Program Working Paper Series 
 
  
yst = αst + γt + χ pst + β΄xst + vst [1] 
where yst represents the level of fiscal transparency in state s in year t, αs is a state fixed 
effect, γt is a year indicator variable, pst is the measure of political competition, xst 
represents other political and economic variables, and vst is the error term. The xst term 
includes key fiscal variables such as deficit, debt, and revenue (all measured in real per 
capita terms). The term also includes socioeconomic controls such as real per capita 
income, income squared, population size, population squared, percent elderly, and 
percent school-aged. To allow for the fact that institutional changes occur, a series of 
lags for the independent variables are included and the lagged dependent variable is 
included as regressor. 
The authors find that political competition tends to increase the level of fiscal 
transparency, whereas polarization appears as positively or negatively related to 
transparency depending on the regression specifications. A Democratic legislature is 
positively associated with transparency when controlling for the effects of debt, fiscal 
imbalance, and polarization; the same occurs when using an Arellano-Bond first-
difference GMM estimation of the main equations rather than fixed effects. Higher 
levels of debt are associated with lower transparency, while fiscal imbalance (in the 
form of higher surpluses or deficits) appears to contribute to greater transparency. 
According the authors, this ―conjunction of debt and deficit results suggest that a deficit 
motivates reform more where the stock of debt is lower, that is, where the deficit more 
resembles a surprise or ‗crisis‘‖ (Alt, Lassen and Rose 2006: 47).  
Esteller-Moré and Polo-Otero (2008) combine political competition variables 
with tax pressure (proxied by the property tax rate) to explain fiscal transparency using 
data from Catalonian municipalities. The study also includes electoral participation, 
population size, and percent elderly as control variables. The resultant fiscal 
transparency indicator is a measure of municipal accountability, specifically, the timely 
submission of the following nine documents to the region‘s Supreme Auditing 
Institution: i) opening budget, ii) budget liquidation, iii) budgetary results, iv) closed 
years‘ budget liquidation, v) cash flow statement, vi) cash flow remainder, vii) balance 
sheet, viii) result statement, and ix) debt statement. Unfortunately, this indicator does 
not account for the accuracy of the documents, and tends to behave almost as a 
dichotomous variable, given that the most of municipalities confront the submission of 
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such documents as an all-or-nothing decision. Nevertheless, the indicator is objective 
and available for a series of consecutive years and for a substantial number of 
municipalities. Logistic model estimation results confirm that electoral competition has 
a positive impact on fiscal transparency, whereas per capita debt has a negative impact. 
Among the control variables, electoral participation promotes fiscal transparency, while 
population negatively affects transparency, but only for the large municipalities (defined 
as those with more than 5,000 inhabitants). 
 
3. Empirical Analysis  
3.1.Questionnaire design and Municipal Governments Surveyed 
To measure budget transparency in Galician municipalities, we designed a 
survey questionnaire composed of fifteen items based on the second, third and fourth 
pillars of the IMF‘s revised Code of Good Practices on Fiscal Transparency (2007). 
Items one through five correspond to the second pillar (open budget processes), items 
six through ten to the third (public availability of information), and items eleven 
through fifteen to the fourth pillar (assurances of integrity). As indicated above, 
adherence to the standards outlined in the first pillar of the IMF Code was not measured 
given that its content was not covered by the OECD Best Practices for Budget 
Transparency, used here as a reference to define the scope of budget transparency. 
Moreover, the most of the contents of the first pillar are beyond the municipalities‘ 
control. Definition of roles and competences along with a legal framework for public 
management are determined by basic national legislation, and are not applied at 
municipalities‘ discretion. 
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Table 2: Survey questionnaire on municipal budget transparency 
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR DATA GATHERING 
(SURVEY ON MUNICIPAL BUDGET TRANSPARENCY) 
MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: .................................................................................................................... 
GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (position of the surveyed): ................................................................................ . 
INSTRUCTIONS: 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements as they pertain to your municipality:  
5 indicates strong agreement, 4 agreement, 3 neither agree nor disagree, 2 disagreement and 1 strong 
disagreement. 
 Full 
disagree 
 
 Full 
agree 
1) The budget is made in accordance with the established timeline (with 
no or rare continuing appropriations) and documentation is submitted 
to the opposition parties early enough for their analysis (i.e. earlier 
than scheduled budget meetings)............................................................. 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
2) Budget estimates and underlying economic assumptions are accurate 
and realistic............................................................................. ................. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
3) Over the fiscal year, periodic information on budget execution is 
submitted on time to the entire Assembly (art. 207 TRLHL)…………. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
4) Budget liquidation and general account are presented on time and 
incorporate the elements necessary to critically evaluate management 
(justification of budgetary changes, interannual comparison, 
explanation of the primary deviations…)…………………….………... 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
5 
5) Budget liquidation is subject to public debate in the Assembly………... 1 2 3 4 5 
6) Financial accounting accurately reflects the patrimonial situation 
(amortizations, consistency principle, inventory, non-accounted 
invoices)……………………………………………………………….. 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
7) Arrears and non-accounted invoices do not significantly distort budget 
liquidation…………………………........................................................ 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
8) Spending programs are submitted to an efficiency analysis (cost-
benefit, cost-utility…) and, in the case of investments, to a study of 
their effects on running costs…………………………………………... 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
9) Citizens participate, to some extent, in creating a spending budget (it 
would comprise of the public consultation procedure and other ways 
in which a transparent participation is assured)…………………..…… 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
10) Budgetary information is available and easily accessible on- and off-
line for consultation by citizens……………..………………….……… 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
11) In local public employment, conditions for access and promotion are 
established and fulfilled in such a way as to ensure transparency and 
equal opportunity……………………………..…………....................... 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
12) Actual observance of the public procurement regulations guarantees 
the integrity, transparency, impartiality and competition in this 
municipal management area.................................................................... 
 
 
1 
 
 
2 
 
 
3 
 
 
4 
 
 
5 
13) Budgeted grants are almost always awarded by competitive merit 
based review……………………………………………….................... 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
14) At least a 70% of the budgetary expenditures are submitted for pre-
audit……………………………………………………………………. 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
15) External auditing bodies receive timely documentation of the 
municipality‘s financial management, and issue reports, from which 
the municipality takes corrective action (in this case, ―documentation‖ 
refers to budget liquidation, general account, lists of contracts and 
inter-governmental agreements, list of agreements to regularise 
irregular expenditures, etc.)……………………………………………. 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
4 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
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The questionnaire items are not only based on the IMF Code but on our own 
practical knowledge about budgetary processes at the local level of government. In 
particular, we tried to construct items to go beyond nominal fiscal transparency to 
measure effective transparency, as well (Heald 2003, 2006). The item selection was 
aimed at covering all the areas of budget content and budgetary process, but avoiding 
redundancy. To start, we constructed a list of 50 items which touched on the three 
pillars of interest within the IMF Code. In a second step, the number of items reduced to 
15 in order that the questionnaire not be perceived as too time-consuming. The 
questions were based on a Likert (1932) scale, i.e., a summative scale consisting of 
Likert-type items. These items are designed as statements with which the respondents  
express their agreement or disagreement. We use numbers from 1 to 5 instead of the 
common wording: strongly disagree, disagree, no opinion, agree, and strongly agree. 
The survey questionnaire was sent to 40 Galician municipalities. Responses 
from 35 were received, but two had to be discarded due to various shortcomings. The 33 
municipalities included in the final sample are listed by alphabetical order in Table 3. 
The population is over 50,000 in three municipalities (13, 24, and 28), between 20,001 
and 50,000 in eight municipalities (1, 3, 10, 14, 23, 25, 27, and 33), between 10,001 and 
20,000 in twelve (2, 5, 6, 9, 15, 17, 18, 22, 29, 30, 31, and 32), between 5,001 and 
10,000 in seven (7, 12, 16, 19, 20, 21, and 26) and below 5,000 in the remaining three 
municipalities (4, 8, and 11). In all cases, the survey was answered by the public 
officials responsible for pre-auditing transactions and/or accounting. Those officials 
were selected by means of a national competitive examination, and they have a deep 
knowledge of financial and fiscal laws as well as the budgetary reality of their 
municipalities.  
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Table 3: Municipalities included in the sample 
1 A Estrada 
2 A Pobra do Caramiñal 
3 Ames 
4 Baltar 
5 Betanzos 
6 Bueu 
7 Caldas de Reis 
8 Calvos de Randin 
9 Cambados 
10 Cangas 
11 Castro Caldelas 
12 Cedeira 
13 Lugo 
14 Marín  
15 Moaña 
16 Mondariz 
17 Monforte de Lemos 
18 Mos 
19 Oroso 
20 Ortigueira 
21 Padrón 
22 Poio 
23 Ponteareas 
24 Pontevedra 
25 Redondela 
26 Ribadavia 
27 Riveira 
28 Santiago de Compostela 
29 Sarria 
30 Teo  
31 Tui 
32 Verín 
33 Vilagarcia de Arousa 
 
3.2. Dimensionality and internal consistency issues 
The most common approach to the analysis of internal consistency of a social 
research instrument is an item analysis which considers both item-total correlation and 
inter-correlation among the items (Colton and Covert 2007: 72, 265-267). Item analyses 
and Cronbach‘s (1951) alpha coefficients are optimal tools for the assessment of 
internal consistency in a unidimensional scale with items measuring different 
substantive areas within a single concept. 
 Thus, in order to determine whether ITA is optimal, we should begin by using 
one of the many factor-analytic techniques currently available to make sure that there 
are no large departures from unidimensionality (Cortina 1993: 103). Taking into 
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account the low number of observations, several principal component analysis tests 
confirmed that the instrument effectively was mainly unidimensional
7
.  
In a second step, we evaluate internal consistency by examining inter-item 
correlations, item-total correlations and Cronbach‘s alpha. This classical approach was 
used for the following reasons: i) it is easily computable in standard statistical packages; 
ii) it compensates for the limited sample size by providing a synthetic measure based on 
all correlation matrix elements; and iii) as multidimensionality would increase the 
underestimating bias of Cronbach‘s α, a high α is a reliable indicator of internal 
consistency
8
. 
Prior to inter-item correlation analysis, the Kolgomorov-Smirnov test on 
normality of data was performed. According to results, the hypothesis of normal 
distribution should not be rejected (p-value<0.05). Thus, the relationships among items 
can be measured through a Pearson correlation coefficient
9
, as shown in Table 4. 
                                                 
7
 Plotting the magnitude of the successive eigenvalues and applying the Cattell‘s (1966) Scree test, a 
sharp drop in eigenvalues from component one is observed. 
8
 Within a hierarchical factor model framework, Zinbarg et al. (2005) demonstrates that α 
underestimates reliability in the first three of four theoretical scenarios: (1) unidimensional scales with 
unequal general factor loadings, (2) multidimensional scales with equal general factor loadings, and (3) 
multidimensional scales with unequal general factor loadings. Only in the fourth case, unidimensional 
scales with equal general factor loadings —i.e., essential tau equivalence—, is α as appropriate as ω to 
measure reliability. Vehkalahti, Puntanen and Tarkkonen (2006: 2) also use alpha‘s underestimating bias 
to justify the search for and proposal of a new estimator suggesting that this estimator, called Tarkkonen‘s 
rho, provides a better alternative for Cronbach‘s α. 
9
 According Revelle (2010: 216), the correlations associated with an ordinal scale are not Pearson‘s 
but Spearman‘s . However, Garson (2008) explains that ordinality in Likert scales refers only to an 
ordinal relationship of values within a single item: Likert response values are ordinal within any given 
item but sets of Likert items are not necessarily ordinal with respect to each other, and they can be used to 
form indexes. 
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Table 4. Correlation analysis by Pearson coefficient. 
    ITEM 1 ITEM 2 ITEM 3 ITEM 4 ITEM 5 ITEM 6 ITEM 7 ITEM 8 ITEM 9 
ITEM 
10 
ITEM 
11 
ITEM 
12 
ITEM 
13 
ITEM 
14 
ITEM 
2 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,39              
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,03 .             
ITEM 
3 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,28 0,31             
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,11 0,08 .            
ITEM 
4 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,59 0,33 0,19            
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,00 0,06 0,29 .           
ITEM 
5 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,31 0,06 –0,01 0,31           
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,08 0,75 0,97 0,08 .          
ITEM 
6 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,35 0,09 0,04 0,37 0,39          
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,05 0,62 0,82 0,03 0,03 .         
ITEM 
7 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,36 0,46 0,35 0,47 0,27 0,44         
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,04 0,01 0,05 0,01 0,13 0,01 .        
ITEM 
8 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,01 0,09 0,37 0,15 –0,08 0,12 –0,03        
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,97 0,61 0,03 0,41 0,65 0,50 0,89 .       
ITEM 
9 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,09 0,41 0,45 –0,10 0,21 0,25 0,45 0,16       
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,61 0,02 0,01 0,59 0,23 0,16 0,01 0,39 .      
ITEM 
10 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,02 0,27 0,37 0,19 0,06 0,21 0,59 0,19 0,32      
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,92 0,13 0,03 0,29 0,72 0,24 0,00 0,29 0,07 .     
ITEM 
11 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,32 0,40 0,26 0,17 0,14 0,27 0,46 –0,19 0,12 0,33     
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,07 0,02 0,14 0,34 0,42 0,13 0,01 0,30 0,51 0,06 .    
ITEM 
12 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,26 0,72 0,31 0,31 0,07 0,24 0,52 0,02 0,32 0,30 0,64    
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,15 0,00 0,08 0,07 0,70 0,18 0,00 0,93 0,07 0,09 0,00 .   
ITEM 
13 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,04 0,58 0,14 0,23 0,05 0,20 0,29 –0,03 0,32 0,04 0,31 0,62   
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,84 0,00 0,42 0,21 0,80 0,26 0,11 0,86 0,07 0,82 0,08 0,00 .  
ITEM 
14 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,23 0,20 –0,02 0,28 0,18 0,51 0,58 –0,08 0,34 0,20 0,28 0,39 0,42  
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,20 0,26 0,90 0,12 0,30 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,05 0,27 0,11 0,03 0,02 . 
ITEM 
15 
Pearson 
Correlation 0,73 0,41 0,44 0,68 0,27 0,45 0,49 0,28 0,17 0,15 0,32 0,41 0,14 0,26 
  
Sig. (2–
tailed) 0,00 0,02 0,01 0,00 0,12 0,01 0,00 0,12 0,35 0,40 0,07 0,02 0,44 0,14 
Source: Authors‘ calculations. 
 
In order to obtain a global appraisal of internal consistency, mean inter-item 
correlation and an alpha coefficient for the total score were computed, with resulting 
values of 0.27 and 0.85, respectively
10
. This alpha clearly satisfies the widely held rule 
of thumb proposed by Nunnaly (1978), that an alpha of 0.7 or higher indicates internal 
                                                 
10
 When calculated from the correlation matrix (Table 4), a standardized alpha of 0.849 is obtained —
the same could be calculated from the covariance matrix by standardizing and summing all items in the 
scale. In our case, the raw alpha provided by SPSS (0.850) is practically equal to the standardized alpha. 
In Table 5, raw alphas from SPSS are reported. 
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consistency. Indeed, such α is within the ideal range between the consistency threshold 
(0.8) and the redundancy threshold (0.9)
11
. 
The next step is to examine the consistency of each item with the scale as a 
whole, so we can identify any items which do not represent the latent variable being 
measured (budget transparency). The key results are in the last two columns of Table 5. 
The penultimate column indicates the correlation between each item and the average of 
the other items, while the last column reveals what the consistency of our scale would 
be if we would delete the given item (De Coster 2004: 47). If an item has a low 
correlation with total and its deletion causes a considerable increase in the alpha score, 
the item is suspected of inconsistency. In our case, items 8 and 5 are the least correlated 
with total and the only ones whose deletion causes an increase in α. Although these 
increases are not considerable, the correlation of item 8 with the average of the other 
items is lower than the normal rule of thumb cited by Steiner and Norman (1995), of at 
least 0.20. It suggests that item 8 is not reflecting only budget transparency but also 
financial management sophistication. Indeed, we expected a peculiar behavior in this 
item because most Galician municipalities have not yet developed a performance 
management approach, but other practical considerations led us to maintain the item. 
                                                 
11
 Although the widely-accepted social science criterion is that alpha should be 0.70 or higher for a set 
of items to be considered a scale, and even a lenient cut-off of 0.60 is common in exploratory research, 
many researchers require a score of 0.80 for a ―good scale‖ (Garson 2008, 2010). On the other hand, a 
high alpha may also suggest a high level of item redundancy, wherein essentially the same item is 
rephrased in several different ways (Boyle 1991). Thus, for example, Fitzpatrick et al. (1998: 23) consider 
that alpha values should not be higher than 0.9 for scales which are used as research tools to compare 
groups. A very high α suggests that there is some redundancy among items, and the possibility that the 
items together are addressing a rather narrow aspect of an attribute. 
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Table 5. Item-Total Statistics. 
 
  
Scale Mean if 
Item Deleted 
Scale 
Variance if 
Item Deleted 
Corrected 
Item-Total 
Correlation 
Cronbach‘s 
Alpha if Item 
Deleted 
ITEM 1 36.45 83.506 0.510 0.840 
ITEM 2 35.70 84.405 0.591 0.836 
ITEM 3 36.79 86.610 0.414 0.845 
ITEM 4 35.70 83.593 0.535 0.838 
ITEM 5 35.76 87.439 0.285 0.856 
ITEM 6 36.52 86.445 0.505 0.840 
ITEM 7 35.76 77.939 0.745 0.824 
ITEM 8 37.27 95.080 0.109 0.856 
ITEM 9 36.82 87.466 0.434 0.844 
ITEM 10 36.21 87.610 0.399 0.846 
ITEM 11 35.73 85.267 0.490 0.841 
ITEM 12 35.55 83.568 0.652 0.833 
ITEM 13 35.91 87.710 0.408 0.845 
ITEM 14 35.18 84.903 0.478 0.842 
ITEM 15 36.00 82.500 0.670 0.831 
 
 
Finally, internal consistency of our three subscales was also evaluated by the 
alpha coefficient, obtaining the following values: Open Budget Processes (items 1 to 5), 
0.649; Public Availability of Information (items 6 to 10), 0.674; and Assurances of 
Integrity (items 11 to 15), 0.748. While these values are lower than the total alpha for all 
15 items together, they can be considered adequate for subscales with a limited number 
of items. Corrected item-total correlation and alpha if item deleted were also computed 
for each subscale, in order to examine the consistency of each item with the subscale as 
a whole. Again, item 8 is the only item whose correlation with the average of the 
remaining items of its subscale is lower than 0.2. This result is consistent with those of 
an additional PCA/FA on our subscales, according to which all of the second subscale‘s 
items besides item 8 loaded onto a single factor. 
3.3. Descriptive analysis of the survey results 
Respondents‘ mean scores by item show the distribution reflected in figure 1, 
with most of the municipalities clustered around the sample mean (2.5778). Insofar as 
this score is below 3, the average perception resulting from the survey is like a fail 
grade in budget transparency. Descriptive statistics by item are shown in Table 6. 
 
Figure 1. Survey results distribution 
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Table 6. Descriptive Statistics. 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Sum Mean Std. Deviation 
ITEM 1 33 1 5 73 2.21 1.293 
ITEM 2 33 1 5 98 2.97 1.075 
ITEM 3 33 1 5 62 1.88 1.193 
ITEM 4 33 1 5 98 2.97 1.237 
ITEM 5 33 1 5 96 2.91 1.444 
ITEM 6 33 1 4 71 2.15 1.034 
ITEM 7 33 1 5 96 2.91 1.331 
ITEM 8 33 1 4 46 1.39 0.747 
ITEM 9 33 1 4 61 1.85 1.064 
ITEM 10 33 1 5 81 2.45 1.121 
ITEM 11 33 1 5 97 2.94 1.171 
ITEM 12 33 1 5 103 3.12 1.053 
ITEM 13 33 1 5 91 2.76 1.091 
ITEM 14 33 1 5 115 3.48 1.228 
ITEM 15 33 1 5 88 2.67 1.109 
Source: Authors‘ survey. 
 
The elements perceived as more transparent are those covered by items 12 and 
14. Both items are proxies for the observance of public procurement regulations and the 
1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
MEAN 
0 
2 
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Frequency 
Mean = 2.5778 
Std. Dev. = 0.65737 
N = 33 
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pre-audit coverage. At the opposite extreme, the less transparent areas are those  
represented by items 8, 9, and 3: efficiency analysis prior to approval of spending 
programs, citizen participation in budget making, and periodic submission  of spending 
information. This last result is easily understandable: while the Spanish Local Finances 
Act (TRLHL) requires access to information on budget execution, the definition is left 
up to each municipal government, leading to a nearly total negligence of this obligation. 
Item 8 has the lowest standard deviation of any item (0.747), suggesting that 
municipalities rarely conduct efficiency analysis prior to the approval of spending 
programs. The mean item score is 1.39, with a minimum possible score of 1. The 
highest standard deviations are those for items 5 (1.444), 7 (1.331), and 1 (1.293), 
which suggests a certain heterogeneity among municipalities with regard to the budget 
liquidation, arrears and non-accounted invoices, timeliness of budget making and 
openness to the opposition. 
Based on the survey results, a fiscal transparency index is constructed in order to 
rank the thirty-three municipalities with regards to transparency. The index is calculated 
by summing the scores recorded for all survey items. So, 
General Transparency Index = ∑ Xi [2] 
where X are the item scores, and i varies from 1 to 15. 
From this straightforward calculation, we calculate an index score for each 
municipality, resulting in the following ranking table. 
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Table 7. Municipal ranking table according to our Fiscal Transparency Index. 
Position Municipality 
Index 
Score Position Municipality 
Index 
Score 
1 Lugo 62 18 Tui 39 
2 Monforte de Lemos 56 19 Oroso 38 
3 Rivadavia 52 20 Santiago de Compostela 37 
4 Ortigueira 50 21 Moaña 36 
5 A Estrada 47 21 Calvos de Randin 36 
5 Padrón 47 23 Redondela 35 
5 Riveira 47 24 Marín  32 
8 Pontevedra 44 25 Baltar 31 
8 Cedeira 44 25 Cambados 31 
8 Caldas de Reis 44 25 Cangas 31 
11 A Pobra do Caramiñal 43 28 Bueu 30 
11 Poio 43 29 Mos 27 
13 Castro Caldelas 42 30 Betanzos 24 
13 Sarria 42 30 Verín 24 
13 Teo  42 32 Mondariz 21 
16 Ames 40 33 Ponteareas 19 
16 Vilagarcia de Arousa 40    
 
Differences in scores among municipalities are significant, with the top-ranked 
municipality (Lugo) scoring 10% higher than the second-ranked municipality (Monforte 
de Lemos) which, in turn, scores three times higher than the lowest ranked municipality 
(Ponteareas). It is equally remarkable that the municipalities ranked lowest for budget 
transparency are those in the worst economic situation (Santiago, Cambados, Cangas, 
Ponteareas, Betanzos), as determined by the Galician Supreme Audit Institution. 
3.4. Econometric analysis of the determinants of budget transparency 
3.4.1. Econometric specification and data 
In order to disentangle the determinants of budget transparency in local 
governments, we have clustered explicative variables into three categories: 
socioeconomic factors, fiscal variables, and political factors. Preliminary analyses were 
run in order to test potential multicollinearity
12
. All variables and data sources are 
defined in table 8. Two are socioeconomic variables (population size and 
unemployment rate), four are fiscal variables (per capita fiscal balance, expenditure 
                                                 
12
 In particular, we detected a high correlation between aging, population size, municipal public 
expenditure over municipal GDP, and per capita GDP. Youth migrate from backward municipalities in 
terms of GDP, bringing about both the ageing and reduction of total population. Insofar as local 
expenditure is partially financed by equalization grants, the public expenditure/GDP ratio tends to be 
higher in the backward municipalities. Dropping per capita GDP and ageing from the specification 
substantially reduced multicollinearity among the independent variables. 
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over municipal GDP, per capita debt, and tax pressure), and four represent political 
features (incumbent‘s ideology, effective number of political parties, coalition 
governments, and political participation). Table 9 reports descriptive statistics for both 
endogenous and exogenous variables. 
Table 8: Definition of explicative variables and data sources 
CATEGORY NAME DEFINITION DATA SOURCE 
Socio-economic POP Number of inhabitants expressed in thousands (2008) www.ige.eu 
Socio-economic U Unemployment rate expressed in percentage (annual average 2008) www.ine.es  
Fiscal BAL Municipal budget balance expressed in per capita euros (2006) www.ccontasgalicia.es and 
www.ine.es  
Fiscal E Municipal public expenditure over GDP expressed in percentage (2006) www.ccontasgalicia.es and 
www.ine.es 
Fiscal D Municipal public debt expressed in per capita euros (2006) www.ccontasgalicia.es and 
www.ine.es  
Fiscal T Municipal taxes expressed in per capita euros (2006) www.ccontasgalicia.es and 
www.ine.es 
Political PART Political participation in the last local election (2007) expressed in 
percentage 
http://www.mir.es/DGPI/  
Political COAL Dummy variable coded 1 in the case of coalition incumbents and 0 otherwise 
(2008) 
Own authors from several 
sources 
Political LEFT Dummy variable coded 1 in the case of leftist incumbents and 0 otherwise 
(2008) 
Own authors from several 
sources 
Political ENPP Effective number of political parties. According to Laakso and Taagapera 
(1979) it is computed using tbe following formula: 
1
2
1
n
i i
N
p



. Where 
n is the effective number of parties and
2
i
p the square of each party’s 
proportion of all votes in 2007 municipal elections. 
Authors calculations with 
data from 
http://www.mir.es/DGPI/  
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of variables 
VARIABLE MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION 
GTI 38.7 9.86 
PTI1 12.9 4.05 
PTI2 10.8 3.54 
PTI3 15.0 3.99 
POP 21.9 23.6 
U 6.66 1.61 
BAL 23.7 79.8 
E 4.70 2.10 
D 482.5 215.3 
T 84.23 26.8 
PART 66.26 5.69 
COAL 0.51 DUMMY VARIABLE (0/1) 
LEFT 0.66 DUMMY VARIABLE (0/1) 
ENPP 3.25 0.55 
 
The expected sign of the independent variables is the following: 
 POP: The expected sign is positive. Larger administrative staffs in large 
municipalities make it easier to meet transparency requirements (Esteller and 
Polo 2008)
13
. 
 U: The expected sign is negative: the worse the economic situation, the stronger 
the temptation to conceal fiscal stress
14
. 
 BAL: The effect of this variable is ambiguous. As explained in section 2, the 
incumbents would hover between their desires to disengage from adverse fiscal 
results and to take credit for positive fiscal outcomes (Alt, Lassen and Rose 
2006)
15
. 
                                                 
13
 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) find a non-significant effect. Esteller and Polo (2008) obtain a negative 
effect, but only for municipalities with over 5,000 inhabitants. 
14
 LaFaive (2009) detects a negative relationship between unemployment and the transparency of a 
Michigan‘s program for economic development. However, Peixoto (2010) finds no correlation between 
the US states‘ levels of unemployment and the transparency of their recovery websites. Moreover, 
Andersen and Nielsen (2010: 28) suggest that the extremely damaging nature of procyclical fiscal policies 
during recessions may trigger reforms that increase the degree of fiscal transparency. Other studies on 
transparency also consider unemployment (Alt, Lassen and Skilling 2001; Rosendorff and Vreeland 
2009), but not as a determinant of transparency. 
15
 In the Alt, Lassen and Rose‘s (2006) empirical analysis, the resulting sign is positive for imbalance 
(both surplus and deficit), implying that the greater deficit spending leads to greater fiscal transparency. 
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 E: Ambiguous. While a larger governmental budget may increase the demand 
for fiscal transparency and provide the administrative support necessary to meet 
transparency requirements (La Porte, Demchak and Jong 2002), a larger budget 
may also increase opportunities for corruption and rent-seeking (Alesina and 
Angeletos 2005)
16
. 
 D: Ambiguous according to the same logic as BAL. 
 T: Positive. When the tax burden is higher, the taxpayers‘ demand for budget 
transparency is stronger
17
. 
 PART: Positive. A higher voter turnout would indicate that citizens have a 
stronger interest in government activities (La Porte, Demchak and Jong 2002: 
428; Esteller and Polo 2008)
18
. 
 COAL: Ambiguous. While Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) argue that coalitions 
lead to greater transparency, Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas (2010) show that more 
political parties corresponds to less electoral control by incumbents. 
 LEFT: Positive. Leftist incumbents are more likely to increase revenues to 
expand public services, and therefore face the greater transparency requirements 
from the public
19
. 
                                                 
16
 La Porte, Demchak and Jong (2002) fail to obtain empirical support for their hypothesized positive 
effect of government size on openness, although in some of their tests the ―government size‖ variable 
does not remain after removing accounting for obvious collinearity. Bastida and Benito (2007: 690-691) 
observe that the relative size of central government presents a low significant (p-value=0.079) negative 
relationship (-0.260) with budget transparency. According to the authors, although the study shows that 
larger central governments are linked to lower levels of transparency, the low significance prevents using 
the evidence to draw a strong conclusion. 
17
 Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) find that per capita general revenues are not significant in most 
estimates. In Esteller and Polo (2008) taxes are only significant at 10% in a cluster model, with the 
expected positive sign. 
18
 Although La Porte, Demchak and Jong (2002) find no empirical support for the hypothesized 
impact of democracy on web site openness, they appear not include the ―voting‖ variable in testing. 
Esteller and Polo (2008), however, confirm a positive relationship between electoral participation and 
fiscal transparency, and Rosendorff and Vreeland (2009) do the same for democracy and transparency. 
Finally, Bastida and Benito (2007: 690) find no significant correlations between their democratic-level 
variables and budget transparency, although they suggest that the direction of the relationships supports 
the notion that greater levels of political and civil liberty, correspond to higher fulfilment of the OECD 
Best Practices for Budget Transparency. 
19
 As pointed out in the above mentioned section, Alt, Lassen and Rose‘s (2006) econometric analysis 
corroborates this positive relationship when controlling for the effects of debt, fiscal imbalance, and 
polarization, as well as when using an Arellano-Bond GMM first-difference estimation of their main 
equations. By contrast, Esteller and Polo (2008) find the variable is not significant, and Bastida and 
Benito (2007: 692) do not find any relationship between ideology and budget transparency. 
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 ENPP: Positive. According to Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006), incumbents will be 
more likely to increase transparency when leaving office, in order to tie the 
hands of their successor. 
Two basic econometric specifications were estimated. While specification [3] is 
used to analyze the determinants of the global transparency index (GTI), specification 
[4] was constructed using information on the three partial indexes (PTI) corresponding 
to the subscales defined above. The list of explanatory variables is the same in both 
cases:  
1 1 1
pn m
i h hi h hi h hi i
h h h
GTI X W Z    
  
               [3] 
1 1 1
( 1,2,3)
pn m
ji j hj hji hj hji hj hji ji
h h h
PTI X W Z with j    
  
            [4] 
 
In both expressions X is the set of n socioeconomic variables, W is the set of m fiscal 
variables, and Z is the set of p political factors. Subindex i refers to municipality (i 
=1,..33) and subindex j to the partial transparency index (j=1,…3). The decomposition 
of the general transparency index into three partial indexes (
3
1
i ji
j
GTI PTI

 ) allows us 
to triple the number of observations (from 33 to 99) and to check for the existence of 
different effects of regressors on the several areas of budget transparency. In the case of 
equation [3], we present results obtained with both the full list of regressors and after 
dropping irrelevant variables
20
, in order to gain precision and degrees of freedom in 
estimates (Table 10). In the case of equation [4], only results obtained from this second 
step are reported (Table 11). 
3.4.2. Econometric methods and results 
Equations [3] and [4] are estimated using Ordinary Least Squares. Given that 
several tests (White, Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey, Cook-Weisberg) detected the presence of 
heteroskedasticity, standard errors are replaced by White robust errors in the case of 
                                                 
20
 Variables defined as those with a t-statistic below unity (in absolute value) in the first step: 4 
variables in the case of equation [3] and up to 13 variables in the case of [4]. A Wald test on the joint 
significance of those variables clearly failed to reject the null hypothesis in both cases (p-values = 0.73 
and 0.42, respectively) 
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specification [3] and clustered errors by municipality in the case of specification [4]. 
Multicollinearity is not a serious concern according to the so-called ―Klein‘s rule‖. 
In both cases, the Ramsey‘s RESET test is computed21. Specification errors may 
be discarded at usual significance levels in all cases. Goodness of fit significantly 
increases when moving form specification [3] (R
2
=0.549) to specification [4] 
(R
2
=0.959). Results are not reported. Normality of residuals was also confirmed 
performing the Jarque-Bera test. 
We also tested the endogeneity of some of the right-hand variables using a 
graphical display of the cumulative sum (CUSUM) of the recursive residuals associated 
with a specific ordering of cross-sectional data (de Luna and Johansson 2008). In 
particular we tested the endogeneity of variables BAL, E and D (T is not relevant to the 
explanation of GTI or PTIj) by sorting the data with respect to those variables and 
looking at recursive residuals obtained from the estimates in column 1 of Table 10. 
Figures 2 to 4 display the CUSUM plots for BAL, E and D and show no evidence of 
endogeneity. 
Figure 2: CUSUM plot. Data sorted with respect to variable E 
 
                                                 
21
 RESET is a general test for the following types of specification errors: Omitted variables, incorrect 
functional form, and correlation between the exogenous variables and the random term which may be 
caused by measurement error or simultaneity, among other things.  
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Figure 3: CUSUM plot. Data sorted with respect to variable BAL  
 
Figure 4: CUSUM plot. Data sorted with respect to variable D 
  
 
Finally, we checked the robustness of the results using the quasi-maximum 
likelihood estimator (QMLE) suggested by Papke and Woolridge (1996) to deal with 
constrained fractional response variables. By definition, variables GTI and PTI are 
constrained on the interval [15-75] and [5-25] respectively. However, OLS does not 
guarantee that the predicted values of the dependent variable lie on the unit interval. The 
QMLE do not suffer from this shortcoming. To facilitate the comparison between the 
OLS and the QMLE estimates, in the last column of Tables 10 and 11 the marginal 
effects of regressors in the sixth model are shown. Since the value of the marginal effect 
depends on the value of all variables in the model, they have been computed with all 
variables held constant at their mean values, except in the case of dummy variables, 
computed for discrete changes from 0 to 1. Results from OLS and QMLE are the same, 
with coefficients and z-statistics slightly higher in absolute value in the case of the 
latter. 
In the case of the global transparency index, five regressors are significant at the 
5% level (U, BAL, COAL, LEFT, ENPP) and one is significant at 10% (E). Variables 
-15
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ENPP, LEFT, and BAL have a positive coefficient and U, E, and COAL show negative 
coefficients. Hence transparency is higher in the case of leftist incumbents and increases 
with electoral competition and better budget balance. Conversely, unemployment, 
coalition incumbents, and budget size in terms of municipal GDP reduce global 
transparency. These results deserve some comments. Our previous hypotheses regarding 
the unemployment impact on transparency are consistent with estimates obtained for 
both U and BAL. The most surprising result is the negative sign on COAL. It suggests a 
trade-off between the desires of tying the partner’s hands (transparency) and escaping 
the vigilance of the partner (opacity), and is resolved in favor of the latter. This is 
understandable given that settling new control or transparency arrangements is more 
conflictive when controllers and controlees are in different parties; “turning a blind eye” 
is one way to reduce conflict to tolerable levels. 
Table 10: Econometric estimates of equation [3] 
Independent variable (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
(dy/dx) 
Intercept 28.11 
(1.03) 
37.09*** 
(3,62) 
0.004 
(0.01) 
 
POP 0.07 
(0.73) 
   
U -2.31*** 
(3.04) 
-2.11*** 
(2.75) 
-0.12*** 
(2.95) 
-2.91 
BAL 0.04*** 
(2.65) 
0.05*** 
(3.87) 
0.003*** 
(4.19) 
0.06 
E -0.98* 
(1.73) 
-0.89* 
(1.78) 
-0.05* 
(1.89) 
-1.20 
D 0.004 
(0.49) 
   
T -0.025 
(0.29) 
   
PART 0.13 
(0.54) 
   
COAL -5.59** 
(2.15) 
-6.45** 
(2.02) 
-0.35** 
(2.15) 
-8.75 
LEFT 9.00** 
(2.59) 
9.35*** 
(3.31) 
0.50*** 
(3.46) 
12.46 
ENPP 5.11 
(1.48) 
4.83** 
(2.34) 
0.260*** 
(2.51) 
6.51 
R2 0.590 0.549   
Log pseudo-likelihood   33.62  
RESET (p-value) 0.166 0.075   
Number of observations 33 33 33  
Econometric Method Robust OLS Robust OLS Robust QMLE  
Notes: Robust t-statistics (columns 1 and 2) or z-statistics (column 3) are in 
parentheses, below the coefficients. In column (4) dy/dx is the marginal effect 
computed with all variables held at their mean values (QMLE coefficients). 
R
2
 is the coefficient of determination.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
Results for partial indexes are also very interesting. The sign of all coefficients is 
the same than in Table 10. Variable POP is now significant at the 10% level under PTI2 
with a positive sign. Variable PART has also become significant to explain PTI1: this is 
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the only partial index that increases with political participation. Variables LEFT and 
COAL are the only variables relevant predictor for all the three partial indexes. Fiscal 
variables are important predictors of PTI1 but not the rest of partial indexes, except BAL 
in the case of PTI3. Unemployment is a significant predictor of both the first and the 
third partial indexes. Finally, ENPP is only relevant in the case of PTI1. 
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Table 11: Econometric estimates of equation [4] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
dy/dx 
Explained Variable PTI1 PTI1 PTI1 
  
 
Intercept 
-3.70 
(0.46) 
-0.88** 
(0.034) 
 
U 
 
-0.86** 
(2.46) 
-0.05*** 
(2.70) 
-1.21 
 
BAL 0.018*** 
(2.92) 
0.001*** 
(3.15) 
0.02 
 
E -0.46 
(1.60) 
-0.25* 
(1.71) 
-0.64 
D 0.007** 
(2.56) 
0.0004*** 
(2.79) 
0.010 
PART 0.20* 
(1.96) 
0.01** 
(2.08) 
0.27 
COAL -2.59* 
(1.82) 
-0.14** 
(1.98) 
-3.58 
LEFT 2.48* 
(1.97) 
0.13** 
(2.03) 
3.31 
ENPP 2.14** 
(2.05) 
0.12** 
(2.29) 
3.02 
Explained variable PTI2 PTI2 PTI2 
Intercept 8.24*** 
(7.72) 
-0.24*** 
(4.20) 
 
POP 0.05* 
(1.75) 
0.003* 
(1.86) 
0.07 
COAL -1.79 
(1.51) 
-0.10* 
(1.64) 
-2.49 
LEFT 3.43*** 
(2.81) 
0.19*** 
(3.00) 
4.70 
Explained Variable PTI3 PTI3 PTI3 
Intercept 20.85*** 
(5.51) 
0.48** 
(2.46) 
 
U -0.88** 
(2.23) 
-0.05** 
(2.43) 
-1.24 
BAL 0.016** 
(2.09) 
0.001** 
(2.34) 
0.022 
E -0.45 
(1.36) 
-0.26 
(1.56) 
-0.47 
D 0.0003 
(0.08) 
0.00002 
(0.11) 
0.0003 
COAL -1.97* 
(1.98) 
-0.12** 
(2.19) 
-2.94 
LEFT 3.81*** 
(3.08) 
0.22*** 
(3.48) 
5.24 
R2 0.959   
Log pseudo-likelihood  -44.06  
RESET (p-value) 0.569   
Number of observations 99 99  
Econometric Method Clustered OLS Clustered QMLE  
Notes: Robust t-statistics (column 1) or z-statistics (column 2) are in 
parentheses, below the coefficients. In column (3) dy/dx is the marginal effect 
computed with all variables held at their mean values (QMLE coefficients). 
R
2
 is the coefficient of determination.***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
 
Using the marginal effects computed with QMLE for the global index, we can 
compare the relative quantitative relevance of the most significant variables. The effect 
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of LEFT is strong: leftist governments tend to enjoy transparency levels 12.46 points 
higher than more conservative governments. Coalition incumbents reduce its 
transparency by 8.75 points. The unemployment rate reduces global transparency by 
2.91 points. An unitary increase in the effective number of political parties increases the 
global index by 6.51, but the standard deviation of this variable is low (0.55). Finally, 
the marginal effect of BAL is very small but the standard deviation is large (more than 
three times the mean). Hence, its effect is also important in some cases. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
From a methodological standpoint, our first conclusion is that relying on 
subjectivity-laden data from internal sources does not necessarily supposes an 
overoptimistic bias in transparency scores. Second, results made clear the necessity of a 
more in-depth examination of the survey questionnaires‘ dimensionality and internal 
consistency. Certain features of the budgetary process may be attributes of more than 
one latent variable, rather than reflecting only budget transparency. 
Finally, while some of our empirical results on the determinants of budget 
transparency confirm previous findings, others point to new relationships. This is the 
case for the statistical significance of unemployment, the negative relationship between 
coalitions and transparency, and the positive impact of debt on the first partial 
transparency index. This last result stands in contrast to the negative effect reported by 
Alt, Lassen and Rose (2006) and Esteller and Polo (2008), and the negative influence of 
deficit on transparency. This contrast could, however, have a suitable explanation. 
While debt may have been accumulated during past fiscal stresses and not to be 
attributable to the current or previous government, deficit supposes a recent and even 
ongoing fiscal stress. Thus, our results may be suggesting that governments are more 
prone to enhance transparency when inheriting a heavy fiscal burden (high debt) and 
enacting sound spending policies (low deficit). 
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